ABSTRACT
INTRODUCTION
Currently, all the railway signalling systems manufacturers have to be compatible with the European Train Control System (ETCS), i.e. the development of any railway product has to meet the standards and tests specified by ETCS. All the devices designed following the ETCS norms must be safety critical, which means that errors must not occur and they must be fault tolerant. To achieve this, standards like EN-50129 [1] should be used. This norm specifies that safety testing is required, but there is no technical specification in the standards on how to implement these tests.
Moreover, the ETCS standards SUBSET-076 [2] and SUBSET-094 [3] that are used as reference to implement the tests of the ETCS On-Board Unit (OBU) do not list any safety testing.
With the aim of accomplishing safety testing, fault injection techniques can be employed. Currently, the behaviour of the train modules in the presence of faults is not tested according to ETCS standards. In real operation when an unexpected fault appears, the system faces a non-tested situation. This is why the systems should be tested in worse case scenarios including faults.
Therefore, to test the modules including safety assessment according to EN-50129 [1] it is necessary to inject faults in the inputs of different modules. For the case of the ETCS OBU it is possible to simulate that wrong information is received due to different factors that could be the missing of a balise, wrong speed information, wrong balise position, etc. This allows testing of the train in the presence of unexpected faults and observing the behaviour of the on-board computer. Therefore, fault injection techniques can be employed by means of saboteurs in communications between physically independent parts. This paper is structured as follows: Firstly, the state of the art describes ETCS and the fault injection techniques. Afterwards, the fault list that might cause a core hazard and type of voters are detailed. The next sections deal with the features of the virtual laboratory used to carry out the test. Then, in the fifth section, the implementation of the saboteurs is described. The following section shows the strategy of performing the tests. The seventh section deals with the results of the carried out tests. And finally, the conclusions of the research work are presented.
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STATE OF THE ART
The state of the art is divided in two subsections: firstly, the descriptions of the European Rail Traffic Management System (ERTMS) and ETCS are presented, and later the fault injection techniques are detailed.
ERTMS
One of the main components of ERTMS is the ETCS. It was designed to replace different national safety systems used in railway that are incompatible among them. This allows to have the same signalling and control system along multiple countries regardless of the train manufacturer [4]. ETCS is specified at four different levels [5] The on-board equipment is safety critical and according to the specifications SUBSET-091 [7] and SUBSET-088 [10] it must has a Tolerable Hazard Rate (THR) less than 10 -9 F/h, or in others words, it is allowed to have maximum one fault every 10 9 hours. For each function on the train a THR is assigned to identify how it contributes to the core hazard. This is described in SUBSET-091 [7] . Therefore, in order to reach this THR the on-board system should be designed against failures.
However, when it comes to testing and assessing the safety level, the ERTMS normative does not mention how to test this capability. Previous European projects such as EMSET [8] and INESS [9] only defined functional testing as the ETCS norms SUBSET-076 [2] and SUBSET-094 [3] . For trackside equipment norms like SUBSET-085 [11] for balises and SUBSET-103 [12] for Euroloop describe the tests needed to approve these devices, but again these standards only address functional tests. However, the normative for safety critical systems, such as ETCS, EN-50129 [1] for railways and EN-61508 [13] generic, specify that fault injection is required to ensure safety in any electronic device used in safety critical devices like railway.
Fault injection techniques
Fault Injection Techniques (FIT) are considered as a very useful approach to evaluate the dependability of a system, and also to reduce costs of field testing [14, 15] [21] . When fault injection is performed during the execution of a simulation, an external device to introduce the fault is required. This device is usually called saboteur. Using saboteurs allows testing of a system or device in a non-invasive way, i.e. no changes on the software or hardware are needed.
FAULT LIST AND TYPES OF SABOTEURS
The saboteur is a device that performs the fault injection. This section details the faults that can cause a core hazard on trains. For each fault, the on-board module involved is detected. Then, it is possible to define all the saboteurs required to simulate the faults. Also an overview of the saboteur's functionality is presented.
Fault list
A dangerous failure for the ETCS on-board equipment is defined as: "failure to provide on-board supervision and protection according to the information provided to the ETCS on-board from external entities" [7] , and only failures that lead to the ETCS Core Hazard (exceeding the safe speed or distance information provided to ETCS) need to be considered. Table 1 shows a list of the events that might cause an ETCS Core Hazard, either alone or in combination with other failures. Additionally, it contains a description of each fault and the on-board element that is involved [7] . There were 27 different events that were identified. Each of these events has to be tested to verify the safety capabilities of the OBU. Table 1 shows that five on-board elements can cause the core hazard, hence one saboteur per element should be implemented to test all the events. The list of the saboteurs includes: BTM, LTM, ODO, TIU and DMI.
Type of saboteurs
The saboteur is connected in the communications interface of two devices, and its objective is to alter the information of the messages. This is why this kind of devices is also called interface saboteurs [22, 23] .
When the saboteur is not injecting faults it acts as a bridge between the two devices, i.e. the communication is not altered, so the devices can send messages between them without any problem. Figure 1 shows the communication between two devices when an interface saboteur is connected and injects a fault to 
VIRTUAL LABORATORY
This section describes the virtual laboratory used to perform the tests. Firstly, the architecture of the laboratory including the saboteurs is detailed. Then, an explanation of all the applications that make up the virtual laboratory is presented. And finally, the steps required to perform a simulation and the messages format are described.
Virtual laboratory architecture
A virtual laboratory is a platform where physical equipment is replaced with computational models, in the field of railway, current tools simulate the behaviour of the telecommunication and control systems [24, 25] . The virtual lab presented in the project "ETCS Advanced Testing and Smart Train Positioning System" (EATS) [26] , allows simulation of the train OBU during a trip, and thanks to the saboteurs it is possible to inject faults that would not occur otherwise during normal operation. With this the behaviour of the OBU under unexpected conditions can be analysed. Figure 2 shows the on-board ERTMS testing laboratory architecture described in [3] but the interface saboteurs are added. The virtual lab follows this architecture, simulating all the elements.
Virtual laboratory applications
The virtual laboratory has five applications that allow the simulation of a journey [26] : -Even feeder: this application reads an XML file with the events of a journey and sends them to the 
Virtual laboratory simulation
The virtual laboratory uses a custom messages format for each interface. Figure 3 shows the format for the odometer, balise and Euroloop events. This means that the journey events (XML file) are converted to this format and they are sent to the other elements by the event feeder.
To simulate a journey in the virtual laboratory the next steps are performed: 1) All the applications must be configured with the controller. 2) Choose journey to simulate.
3) The event feeder sends the events to the corresponding elements (BTM, LTM, etc.). 4) All the elements (BTM, LTM, etc.) process the messages received from the event feeder and they send the new messages to the EVC. 5) The EVC receives the messages from all the elements and saves them. 6) When all the events are received the EVC sends the events to the EFS and the simulation starts.
7) The DMI receives information from the EFS to show it. 8) When the simulation ends a JRU file is created with the simulation information.
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE SABOTEURS
The next subsections describe how the saboteurs are implemented and the process to detect the network packages in order to be able to inject the faults defined in Table 1 .
Features of the interface saboteur
Interface saboteurs for virtual lab test bench are implemented through a commercial Linux board. The decision of choosing a Linux board is based on the features that this operating system (OS) offers, which enables the use of all routing characteristics like IP-tables.
The saboteur's features are explained below: -Database: each saboteur contains a database with the information of the actions that can be performed. -Listening controller: this software applies all the IP-tables rules in order to redirect the messages to the saboteur. -Actuator: this application receives the redirected messages and performs the sabotage based on the information stored in the database. Figure 4 shows a configuration and running software execution order for interface saboteurs. First the external controller configures the database and makes a TCP/IP connection with the listening controller. After that, the listening controller interprets filtering information from database and applies IP-tables. Finally, the listening controller runs as many actuators at proper ports based on the filtering rules as specified in the database.
Saboteur actions
This section describes the process of how the network messages are sabotaged. To achieve this, the saboteurs must be configured, they must capture the network traffic and modify the information at the communication protocol layer.
The listening controller receives all the TCP messages and when one message matches the filter criteria it is sent to the actuator. On the other hand, if the packet does not match the criteria the saboteur acts as a bridge and the message is sent to the original end-point. The filter criteria are stored in the database and are based on these parameters: source IP, destination IP, source port, destination port and event type (this is inside the packet payload, see Figure 3 ).
At this point, the actuator at the interface saboteur elaborates a reply to the source IP / source Port of the redirected packet, since communication protocol (TCP/IP) defines an echo response of the end device for each packet received containing data. The interface saboteur does not need to spoof any IP or MAC address since the sending or replying IP or MAC address has no impact on the logic functionality of the lab testbed software. When the response is sent it is time to perform the sabotage. To do this it is necessary to get the information from the database. The database has two main tables: the first one has the information about all faults that can be injected and the other table has the time in which each fault is injected. Table 2 shows the information about BTM faults. The "Chain id" indicates the table name that contains the information about the times to inject the faults. Table 3 illustrates an example of the information stored in IS-2 which relates to BTM-H4 "transmission of an erroneous telegram, interpretable as correct". The time at which the fault is injected is random, but it has to be within two ranges (t_on and t_off). Once fault information is inserted into the packet, it has to be sent to the original communication endpoint. For this purpose, the saboteur establishes a TCP/IP connection with the original communication. The saboteur acts in the same way as the original communication, which means that TCP/IP connection from the saboteur with the end-point only is made when the original starting-point is establishing the connection, and it is released when the original starting-point releases the connection.
TEST STRATEGY
This section shows the test strategy designed in order to detect the faults with more impact in the system behaviour.
The main objective of the test strategy is to detect the worst case scenarios for the system; therefore, the test was performed following this plan of action: 1) A reference journey is simulated with each fault defined in Table 1 (Section 3.1), which means that 27 tests are performed.
2) The faults are applied in the following way: for ODO and DMI, time windows for fault injection are included and the faults are injected randomly. On the other hand, for BTM, LTM and TIU faults are injected in all the events. The file used as reference journey was chosen because it contains all types of messages (ODO, TIU, DMI, LTM and BTM). On the other hand, the journeys selected to test the worst faults were created to test particular situations on the train. Table 4 shows the twelve journeys and the element under test.
To verify the effect of the saboteurs, a simulation without faults is performed and the JRU file is saved, so it is possible to compare this file with the JRUs with faults. Another way to see the effect of the saboteurs is in the DMI; if any change occurs it should be shown in the DMI.
RESULTS
This section shows the analysis and the results of the tests made following the strategy proposed in the previous chapter. First, the results obtained using a reference journey are analysed with the aim of identifying the worst cases based on the result of the ETCS OBU behaviour. Then, the results of the worst cases injected to other scenarios are presented. Table 5 shows all the obtained results when the faults are applied to the reference journey.
Reference journey results
With the results obtained so far (see Table 5 ) it can be concluded that the DMI faults only have effect in the driver's screen, i.e. the JRU does not detect the changes made by the saboteur, because the faults injected directly to the DMI do not have any effects in the OBU. Moreover, in TIU faults some changes in the JRU file are observed, but this does not affect the OBU. There are two kinds of TIU messages: the messages sent by the TIU that just informs about the status of some elements (brake, cab, etc.) and the messages sent by the EVC to change the status of the elements. The TIU saboteur alters the messages that inform about the status, and these produce changes in the JRU but they do not have any effect on the system.
On the other hand, in the odometer faults it can be observed that if speed is changed and exceeds the limit the train activates the emergency brake. Thus, this fault significantly affects the simulated journey. The same behaviour occurs with balise or Euroloop faults when they are applied to elements that contain movement authority information. If one of these elements is not detected the emergency brake is also activated.
As mentioned in Section 6 to check the effects of the faults the JRU and the DMI are used. Figure 5 shows the DMI when the fault ODO-2 is injected, and the emergency brake is activated [28] . Figure 6a shows the JRU file of the reference journey in a normal operation. On the other hand, Figure 6b shows the JRU file in the same point, but fault BTM-H1 is injected. As it can be observed the emergency brake is activated. The tests made show that the worst effect on the OBU is when the faults cause the activation of the emergency brake, therefore, two faults were chosen as the worst cases: ODO-2, when the speed exceeds the limit the emergency brake is activated and BTM-H1, when the OBU expects a balise or Euroloop with movement authority and it is not detected the emergency brake is also activated.
Figure 5 -DMI when the fault ODO-2 is injected
Worst case scenarios
Finally, the worst faults are injected to the whole set of journeys (see Table 4 ). This means that 24 tests are performed (12 with the ODO-2 and 12 with BTM-H1). Table 6 shows the results obtained when the fault BTM-H1 was injected to each journey. On the other hand, when fault ODO-2 is injected the result obtained in all the journeys is the same: the emergency brake is activated. Figure 7 shows the JRU of the scenario 2 when the fault is injected, the emergency brake is activated and it is possible to observe the speed of the train of 360 km/h (the speed in the JRU file is divided by 5, and that is why it is shown as 72). The results obtained in the 12 scenarios are very similar to the reference journey, i.e., when an unexpected situation occurs during the journey, the OBU actives the emergency brake. Since this is a safety critical system and the safe mode is to apply the brakes, it can be stated that this is the correct behaviour of the system [29] .
CONCLUSION
A new testing platform for the railway sector using saboteurs and a virtual laboratory was created. It allows verifying the behaviour of the train OBU to unexpected faults in different interfaces (BTM, LTM, ODO, DMI and TIU). To check the consequences of faults, they were injected in distinct journeys and situations which proves the flexibility of the created platform.
The testing strategy allowed testing of all the events that can cause an ETCS core hazard, and the faults that have more impact on the OBU were detected. After that, the detected faults were analysed in multiple journeys to verify the safety in all cases.
The worst case is the activation of the emergency brake, which only occurs with BTM and ODO faults. However, it is important to note that all the BTM faults have the same effect on the OBU because if a balise with MA is changed or cannot be decoded for the EVC it is equal to delete it.
The tests made in all the journeys show that the emergency brake is activated in two situations: when the train does not detect a balise with movement authority information and when the odometer's speed exceeds the limit. This is the correct behaviour, because in unforeseen situations the OBU goes to the safe mode.
Therefore, it is possible to affirm that the platform presented allows testing of the train's OBU against faults, which is a must in safety-critical systems. Moreover, the tests are performed in a virtual laboratory (simulation), reducing cost and time. 
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